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The Supreme Court's 1964 decision in New York Times v. Sul-
livan inaugurated an era of increasingly complex first amendment 
categories and catchwords. First amendment lawyers today speak 
of public and private figures, actual malice or negligence, the four-
part Central Hudson test,4 the three-step O'Brien analysis,s and type 
one, two, and three public fora. Judge Bork recently criticized this 
tendency "to adhere to sharply-defined categories" in first amend-
ment adjudication. Scholars and judges, he mused, "enunciate such 
things as four-factor frameworks, three-pronged tests, and two-
tiered analyses in an effort, laudable by and large, to bring order to 
a universe of unruly happenings." But this "mechanical jurispru-
dence," he warned, falters when "life ... bring[s] up cases whose 
facts simply cannot be handled by purely verbal formulas. "6 
I. Professor of Law, Northwestern University. 
2. Late Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles. The author and edi-
tors note with sadness the death of Professor Nimmer while this book review was in 
preparation. 
3. Assistant Professor of Law, University of Illinois. I wish to thank Andrew Lloyd 
Merritt and John E. Nowak for their helpful comments. 
4. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 
(1980). 
5. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). Although O'Brien mentioned 
four factors, the first (whether the challenged regulation "is within the constitutional power 
of the Government") has been disregarded as trivial. See, e.g., Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case 
Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. 
REv. 1482, 1483-84 n.IO (1975). Compounding its numerology, O'Brien has given birth to 
the "two-track" theory of first amendment jurisprudence. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW§ 12-2 (1978). 
6. Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 994 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en bane) (Bork, J., concur-
ring), cert. denied, I 05 S. Ct. 2662 ( 1985). 
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Two recent books by first amendment scholars pursue this de-
bate between those who would loosen the bonds of first amendment 
jurisprudence and those who approve of the Court's current codifi-
cation. Martin Redish, in a volume collecting six of his law review 
articles, joins Bark in deploring "judicial or scholarly attempts to 
seek rigid, unbending answers to issues too complex for such solu-
tions. "7 Instead, Redish urges the adoption of "more flexible guide-
lines" that will "foster the value served by free speech more fully 
and reconcile competing social interests more effectively."s He ap-
plies this approach to five recurrent first amendment problems: de-
fining the function of free speech, distinguishing between content-
based and content-neutral regulations, judging prior restraints, pun-
ishing advocacy of illegal conduct, and evaluating overbroad 
statutes. 
Melville Nimmer's new first amendment treatise, on the other 
hand, painstakingly elaborates many of the canons and conventions 
developed by the Supreme Court during the last twenty years.9 
Although Nimmer criticizes some of the Court's specific results, he 
embraces the Court's approach to first amendment adjudication. 
Cases are sorted according to type, subjected to specified standards, 
and analyzed with the appropriate factors. Nimmer's theoretical 
perspective on the first amendment thus offers a marked contrast to 
Redish's methodology.w 
I 
Redish begins his quest for a flexible jurisprudence by rejecting 
7. M. REDISH, supra, at 4. Redish's agreement with Bork on this point does not por-
tend agreement on other first amendment issues. Redish vehemently disagrees with Bork's 
scholarly work advocating that only "explicitly political" speech merits constitutional protec-
tion. Compare Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. I, 
20-35 (1971), with M. REDISH, supra, at 15-19, 22-26. 
8. M. REDISH, supra, at 4. 
9. Portions of Nimmer's treatise, like Redish's book, are drawn from previously pub-
lished law review articles. Again like Redish, Nimmer does not purport to treat comprehen-
sively all free speech issues. Although labeled a "treatise," the book "deals primarily with the 
theory of the First Amendment." M. NIMMER, supra, at vii. The most notable omissions 
from Nimmer's coverage are his failure to discuss commercial speech, obscenity, and speech 
threatening national security. 
10. In addition to differing over these theoretical issues, Nimmer and Redish disagree 
over the most basic problem of first amendment jurisprudence: Redish discusses the "first 
amendment" while Nimmer analyzes the "First Amendment." In this debate, Redish has 
scholarly authority on his side. See A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION§ 8, at 32 (13th ed. 
1981). But Nimmer appeals to principles of natural justice. "As everyone knows," Nimmer 
declares, "-with the glaring exception of law review editors-it is the First Amendment, not 
the first amendment." He then incites all "(t]hose who believe in freedom of speech" to 
"~gin by rejecting the tyranny of the Uniform System of Citation." M. NIMMER, supra, at 
Vll. 
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attempts to tie speech to a single, narrowly defined function or to a 
rigid hierarchy of functions. He maintains instead that freedom of 
speech serves a broad interest in "individual self-realization." This 
self-realization takes two forms: development of the individual's in-
tellectual powers and achievement of control over decisions affect-
ing the individual's life. Freedom of speech "fosters the former goal 
directly in that the very exercise [of] one's freedom to speak, write, 
create, appreciate, or learn represents a use, and therefore a devel-
opment, of an individual's uniquely human faculties." The same 
freedom "fosters the latter value indirectly because ... it facilitates 
the making of [life-affecting] decisions. "II 
Because Redish defines the value of free speech so broadly, his 
definition of protected speech is correspondingly broad. Indeed, he 
claims to "extend the reach of the first amendment protection fur-
ther than does virtually any other commentator."I2 Commercial 
speech, corporate communications, strings of obscenities, and per-
haps even primal screams qualify as speech under Redish's theory.IJ 
Redish, moreover, insists that courts should not differentiate among 
these varieties of speech on the basis of their value. He ardently 
rejects the Supreme Court's recent attempts to calibrate levels of 
first amendment protection according to the perceived worth of the 
speech.I4 For Redish, the string of obscenities and classic political 
speech have the same first amendment status. To distinguish be-
tween the two kinds of speech, he contends, conflicts with the no-
tion of free will "inherent in the self-realization principle." 1s 
Individuals, rather than societal censors, must determine the value 
of particular communications; otherwise individuals can neither 
II. M. REDISH, supra, at 21-22 (emphasis in original). 
12. /d. at 7. 
13. /d. at 30, 57-60, 60-68. 
14. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985) (plurality 
opinion); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (plurality opinion). In Dun & Brad-
street, a plurality of the Court referred to this differentation as an established principle of first 
amendment law. The plurality opinion observed that Supreme Court decisions had ""long 
recognized that not all speech is of equal First Amendment importance" and cited a litany of 
decisions demonstrating that fact. 105 S. Ct. at 2945 & n.5. The plurality added to that line 
of cases by holding that defamatory speech "on matters of purely private concern" deserves 
less constitutional protection than defamatory statements involving issues of public concern. 
/d. at 2946. The Chief Justice and Justice White, concurring separately in the judgment, 
endorsed the latter distinction. /d. at 2948 (Burger, C.J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 
2954 (White, J., concurring in the judgement). Neither Justice, moreover, disputed the plu-
rality's statement that Supreme Court precedents recognize a hierarchy of types of speech 
based upon the importance of the message. Thus, a majority of the Court currently appears 
comfortable with a first amendment stratified on the basis of the importance or value of the 
speech. 
15. M. REDISH, supra, at 12. 
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fully develop their intellectual capacities nor choose the information 
relevant to their own decisions. 
Although Redish defines "speech" broadly, he by no means in-
sists on absolute protection. On the contrary, he "frankly recog-
nize[s] the need for the judiciary to reconcile the free speech right 
with competing governmental interests."t6 His prescription for that 
reconciliation again evidences his commitment to flexibility and 
case-by-case adjudication. Rather than erecting categorical rules-
like the New York Times actual malice standard-to resolve broad 
classes of first amendment claims, Redish pleads for "a significant 
degree of judicial discretion in balancing competing social interests, 
often in individual cases." 11 
This is a novel suggestion, especially for a writer billing himself 
as a first amendment "protectionist." The traditional wisdom holds 
that judicial discretion and balancing allow the courts too much 
freedom to penalize unpopular speakers. Redish challenges this or-
thodoxy, noting that any method of first amendment adjudication 
ultimately depends upon the judiciary's willingness to protect first 
amendment values in the face of popular opposition. Even the "use 
of rigid categories . . . cannot effectively guard against a judiciary 
either insensitive to free speech concerns or caught up in a nation's 
paranoia." 1s The supposed benefits of categorical rules are there-
fore imaginary, but the costs are weighty; Redish argues with some 
justification that rigid tests are unworkable, deceptive, and under-
protective of first amendment freedoms.t9 
Redish's cost-benefit analysis, however, may underestimate the 
danger that case-by-case balancing will accelerate the Court's cur-
rent tendency to distinguish among speakers based on the supposed 
value of their messages. Unfortunately for Redish's thesis, some of 
the same Justices who have attempted to sidestep the Court's cate-
16. /d. at 8. 
17. !d. at 260. Although Redish merely sketches the outlines of his balancing process, 
it is not as formless as his rhetoric first suggests. Instead, his "case-by-case judicial flexibil-
ity" contains a number of familiar doctrinal ingredients: a presumption in favor of free ex-
pression, the requirement of a compelling governmental interest, and a search for least 
restrictive means to implement that interest. !d. at 261. Redish admits, moreover, that in 
certain situations "more narrow formulations," such as the clear-and-present-danger test, 
should replace indeterminate balancing. Even relatively rigid rules, such as the actual malice 
standard, may play some role in this restructured first amendment jurisprudence. /d. at 261-
62. Still, Redish advocates a significant change of emphasis in first amendment adjudication. 
He would begin analysis of every claim with a commitment to flexibility, rather than with the 
current determination to pigeonhole the claim into a preexisting category. For Redish, tests 
and formulae seem to be convenient shortcuts, employed only occasionally and only when a 
controversy clearly fits the pattern of previous cases. 
18. !d. at 262. 
19. !d. at 261-62. 
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gorical rules and deliver narrow pronouncements tailored to the 
controversies at hand have also shown the greatest affinity for rank-
ing speech according to its value.2o These characteristics may be 
related: the very individuality of the analysis in these cases may 
have contributed to the Justices' willingness to consider the value of 
the speech before them. 
Even more radical than Redish's advocacy of balancing is his 
rejection of any distinction between content-based and content-neu-
tral regulations. Redish argues that the supposed difference be-
tween content-based and content-neutral regulations is illusory. In 
support of this claim, he points to flag desecration statues and 
prohibitions on the use of profanity in public-both of which can be 
defensibly characterized as content-neutral restrictions on the man-
ner of expression or as content-based bans of particular expressive 
symbols. The status of subject matter restrictions on speech, such 
as bans of commercial advertising or obscenity, is also uncertain 
under the content distinction. Pursuing this elusive distinction be-
tween content-based and content-neutral regulations, Redish con-
cludes, "only obscures the appropriate inquiry in a sea of 
semantics. "2t 
Of even greater concern to Redish than these practical 
problems is the theoretical inconsistency he perceives between the 
content distinction and fundamental principles of first amendment 
thought. No matter what function one ascribes to free speech, Red-
ish reasons, any lessening of speech-no matter how content-neu-
tral-frustrates that goal. Indeed, a content-neutral ban on all 
expression is more likely to retard self-fulfillment, self-government, 
the search for truth, the checking value, or any other first amend-
ment function than is a content-based restriction on only some ex-
pression. "In a perverse sense ... ," Redish observes, "it appears 
that the more expression we prohibit, the closer we come" to avoid-
ing suspect content distinctions.22 
In light of these difficulties, Redish admonishes the courts to 
reject the content distinction and to subject all infringements of free 
speech to a uniform analysis. Whether or not a law regulated 
speech on the basis of content, he would require the government to 
establish a compelling interest and to show that " 'feasible' less re-
strictive alternatives [were] inadequate to accomplish [its] end." If 
these prerequisites were met, a court employing Redish's test would 
20. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (plurality opinion); Young v. 
American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (plurality opinion). 
21. M. REDISH, supra, at 91-92, Ill, 114-16. 
22. /d. at Ill. 
1986] BOOK REVIEW 239 
balance the state's regulatory interest against the restriction on the 
speaker's opportunities to speak: restrictions imposed on speakers 
with few alternative means of communication would require greater 
governmental justifications.23 
Redish's provocative arguments persuaded me that the courts' 
use of the content distinction has become overly mechanical and 
rigid. The content distinction should not operate as a jurispruden-
tial watershed, fortuitously channeling some claims to the harsh wa-
ters of strict scrutiny while washing others into a warm sea of 
O'Brien balancing. Such a rigid classification does divert the courts' 
attention from more meaningful issues and can lead to arbitrary re-
sults in particular cases. 
I am less convinced, however, by Redish's suggestion that the 
courts should virtually abandon the content distinction.24 The ex-
tent to which a regulation targets specific speakers or messages 
often signals the legislature's motive in enacting the law. When a 
law is "content-neutral," or applicable to a wide variety of speakers, 
it is unlikely that the government adopted the restriction simply to 
suppress unpopular messages.zs Since the legislators themselves 
(and the majority they represent) must abide by any content-neutral 
regulation, they must have perceived an overwhelming need for the 
law-one that would justify even restrictions on the majority's lib-
erty. Under these circumstances, the courts may give some weight 
to the legislature's determination that a compelling interest sup-
ported the regulation. On the other hand, when a law restrains only 
a few speakers or messages, this political check is weaker. The leg-
islature may have undervalued the interest of those speakers, or 
may have acted specifically to suppress their speech. Hence, the 
courts should scrutinize the legislature's actions more closely and 
demand a stronger justification for the action than they would for a 
content-neutral regulation. 
Thus, although the content distinction need not rigidly con-
strain first amendment analysis, it should at least influence a court's 
23. /d.atll?-18. 
24. At one point, Redish admits that the "content factor" is not "always irrelevant" to 
first amendment adjudication. ld. at 120. His only concrete suggestion for use of the con-
cept, however, is in cases in which the government claims a content-neutral justification for a 
law but the law itself distinguishes speech on the basis of content. In such cases, the govern-
ment destroys its own case, because the language of the regulation "will reveal that the gov-
ernment does not really believe that its asserted content-neutral justification is valid." 
25. As Justice O'Connor recently explained: "When the State imposes a generally ap-
plicable [restriction], there is little cause for concern. We need not fear that a government 
will destroy a selected group of [citizens] by burdensome (regulation] if it must impose the 
same burden on the rest of its constituency." Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota 
Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 585 (I 983). 
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assessment of the constitutionality of a particular regulation. An 
appropriate place to account for the content distinction appears in 
the last stage of Redish's unified analysis. When courts "balance 
the compellingness of the state interest served by the law against the 
availability of alternative means of expression to the speaker,"26 
they could also consider the extent to which the law singles out 
particular speakers or messages. Laws that disproportionately af-
fect a few speakers or messages, like laws that leave few alternative 
channels of communication, should require stronger government 
justifications. By adding this weight to the balance, courts could 
more fully realize Redish's promise of a first amendment jurispru-
dence tailored to the facts of the particular case. 
II 
While Redish attacks the roots of the Supreme Court's verdant 
first amendment jurisprudence, Melville Nimmer happily arranges 
the leaves and fruit of that garden. Like a nineteenth century natu-
ralist, he diligently identifies the myriad species of first amendment 
controversies and organizes them into a taxonomy of first amend-
ment thought. Along the way, he enthusiastically collects many of 
the distinctions and categories rejected by Redish. 
At the outset, Nimmer posits a fixed hierarchy of discrete val-
ues served by the first amendment; this contrasts sharply with Red-
ish's expansive concept of self-realization. For Nimmer, the most 
important function of free speech is enlightenment. Only by main-
taining "open channels of communication" can citizens pursue "the 
search for all aspects of knowledge and the formulation of enlight-
ened opinion on all subjects." A second function, self-fulfillment, is 
analogous to the component of Redish's self-realization value relat-
ing to development of the individual's mental faculties. In Nim-
mer's scheme, however, that function enjoys only a subordinate 
role. Still less important is the safety valve function, which rests 
upon the assumption that "men will be less inclined to resort to 
violence to achieve given ends if they are free to express themselves 
through speech advocating such ends." These last two interests, 
Nimmer suggests, will rarely overcome social interests in regulating 
speech, except when combined with a threat to the enlightenment 
function.21 
Nimmer's pyramid of speech values leads him to provide dif-
ferent levels of protection to different speakers. While Redish be-
26. M. REDISH, supra, at 118. 
27. M. NIMMER, supra, §§ 1.02 to 1.04. 
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lieves that all speech, whatever its source, has the same potential to 
promote self-realization, Nimmer concludes that some speakers fos-
ter enlightenment to a greater extent than other speakers. His de-
fense of this position, however, proves somewhat ambivalent. For 
example, since speech by the media reaches more listeners than does 
speech by private individuals, Nimmer argues that media defend-
ants merit more protection in defamation suits than do nonmedia 
defendants.2s He forthrightly acknowledges, however, that there is 
no proof that media communications enlighten public opinion more 
significantly than do private conversations. Indeed, Nimmer credits 
the private "marketplace of ideas operating outside of the media" 
for reversing public opinion on the Vietnam War when the media 
still supported the War.29 Furthermore, he admits that even when 
the media originate an idea, acceptance of the concept (and true 
enlightenment) may come only through private discussion and criti-
cism.3o Given Nimmer's own reservations on this subject, it is not 
surprising that the Supreme Court recently rejected the distinction 
he advocates. 31 
Nimmer joins Redish in insisting that any absolute interpreta-
tion of the first amendment "simply will not wash."32 Rather than 
endorsing balancing on a case-by-case basis, however, Nimmer ad-
vocates "definitional balancing." In definitional balancing, he ex-
plains, a court balances competing social interests "not for the 
purpose of determining which litigant deserves to prevail in the par-
ticular case, but only for the purpose of defining" what level of pro-
tection that type of speech deserves under that type of 
circumstance.33 As in New York Times v. Sullivan, the court thus 
28. /d. § 2.05(C][l], at 2-53 through 2-55; § 2.08[E], at 2-125 through 2-127. 
29. !d. § 1.02[0], at 1-18. 
30. Nimmer's colleague, Steven Shiffrin, has made this point succinctly: "The issue, if 
influence is to be the test, is whether the communication to five million people is more influ-
ential than the communications of the five million people who discuss that communication at 
breakfast tables, at work, in taxicabs, in bars, in universities, and elsewhere." Shiffrin, De-
famatory Non-Media Speech and First Amendment Methodology, 25 UCLA L. REv. 915, 
931-32 (1978). In response to the suggestion that enlightenment may follow as much from 
private individuals discussing media communications as from the media communications 
themselves, Nimmer argues only that "the impact of five million individual communications 
is comparable to a single media communication to five million listeners or viewers only if 
each of the five million individuals convey essentially the same message." M. NIMMER, 
supra, § 2.05(C][l], at 2-55. This curious rejoinder seems to assume that enlightenment is 
most complete if everyone hears the same message and adopts the same view. For most 
issues, however, such complete consensus is impossible. Under these circumstances, it seems 
that the richness and diversity of five million private conversations would produce more un-
derstanding and knowledge than would a single platitude uttered by a newscaster during the 
evening news. 
31. Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985). 
32. M. NIMMER, supra, § 2.01, at 2-4. 
33. /d. § 2.03, at 2-15. 
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strikes the balance between free speech interests and competing so-
cial values for a broad class of cases. The advantages of definitional 
balancing, according to Nimmer, are that it (1) promotes certainty 
by generating a rule applicable to a whole category of claims; (2) en-
courages the courts to think generally about the values of free 
speech rather than about the merits of the particular speech at issue; 
and (3) insulates judges from popular pressure to decide specific 
cases against unpopular speakers.34 
It would be impossible to decide here whether definitional bal-
ancing produces "better," more principled, or more libertarian deci-
sions than case-by-case decisionmaking. During the last few years, 
however, the Supreme Court has decided at least two significant 
first amendment cases by engaging in a rather explicit form of defi-
nitional balancing.3s If the Court continues to move in this direc-
tion, scholars and practitioners need to understand the premises 
and effects of that technique. Nimmer's defense of definitional bal-
ancing-especially when read together with Redish's contrary plea 
for more individual decisionmaking-provides a firm foundation for 
further exploration of these questions. 
Nimmer's treatment of other first amendment issues, such as 
his approval of the content distinction, follows the same pattern of 
adopting and elaborating doctrinal tools eschewed by Redish. The 
most dramatic manifestation of Nimmer's affinity for categories and 
classifications, however, appears in his organization of the treatise. 
Nimmer organizes all first amendment issues under three questions: 
What is speech? What is abridgement? What interests justify the 
abridgement of speech? 36 This tripartite scheme departs from the 
34. !d. at 2-17 through 2-18. Nimmer concedes that, as Redish argues, unscrupulous 
judges may be able to manipulate definitional rules as easily as ad hoc balances. He contends, 
however, that definitional rules help judges who want to avoid political pressure in individual 
cases. "How much easier it would be for a conscientious judge to explain to the members of 
the Lions Club that he found as he did becasue that was 'the rule,' " Nimmer notes, "rather 
than because upon a weighing of the interests involved he found weightier the side that public 
opinion opposed." !d. at 2-18. 
35. Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985) (plurality opinion) 
(concluding that plaintiffs need not prove actual malice before recovering presumed and puni-
tive damages for defamatory statements involving no matters of public concern); New York 
v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (placing child pornography outside the first amendment). 
36. Thus chapter 3, entitled On What Constitutes "Speech" Within the Meaning of the 
First Amendment, discusses problems such as nonpolitical speech, private speech, false 
speech, emotive speech, and symbolic speech. Chapter 4, entitled On What Constitutes 
"Abridging" the Freedom of Speech, addresses matters such as the state action requirement, 
the distinction between prior restraints and subsequent punishment, the imposition of uncon-
stitutional conditions, and the denial of access to public fora. Chapter 2, which corresponds 
to the problem I have labeled "what interests justify the abridgement of speech," is actually 
entitled On Determining the Limits of "the Freedom" Guaranteed by the First Amendment. 
That chapter discusses the concept of definitional balancing at length and then considers 
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traditional organization of first amendment casebooks and treatises, 
which tend to treat serially a dozen or more discrete first amend-
ment issues. 
Some readers may find this organization confusing, but I found 
it a useful means of stressing the parallels between frequently sepa-
rate areas of first amendment law. The question whether libel is 
"speech" is similar to the question whether a red flag is "speech." 
Both questions require a court to determine whether the alleged 
speech furthers the values underlying the first amendment, whether 
it fits the category of "speech" envisioned by the amendment's 
framers, and whether the speech can be distinguished from other 
activities that the court clearly considers conduct. Similarly, a pro-
tester complaining that she was denied permission to pass out hand-
bills on a street comer has something in common with a public 
school teacher claiming that he was fired after writing an editorial 
for the local paper; both assert that their capacity for speech has 
been abridged through the withholding of an important government 
benefit. Although recognition of these similarities is not new, Nim-
mer highlights them through his meticulous organization of the 
Supreme Court's first amendment jurisprudence. 
III 
The tension between fixed rules and flexible decisionmaking 
runs throughout the law. More than fifty years ago, Justice Holmes 
declared that "when the standard is clear it should be laid down 
once for all by the Courts."37 Seven years later, Justice Cardozo 
rejected Holmes's rule, which would have required motorists to 
alight from their vehicles when necessary to reconnoitre at railroad 
crossings, as "artifically developed" and "imposed from without. "3s 
Today, some scholars and jurists similarly have begun to challenge 
the first amendment rules "laid down once for all" during the last 
twenty years. Others defend those principles as bulwarks against 
censorship. As the controversy gains momentum, Martin Redish 
and Melville Nimmer offer readers a stimulating preview of the 
main theoretical arguments in the debate. 
several specific issues such as the extent to which the interests in copyright or reputation 
should outweigh the interest in free speech. 
37. Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66, 70 (1927). 
38. Pokora v. Wabash Ry., 292 U.S. 98, 105 (1934) (limiting Baltimore & O.R.R. v. 
Goodman to its facts). 
